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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #447-83/1  
20 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 18 January 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED]

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Attachment  
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## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE

Analysts agree that the NRM is gaining momentum, but they do not believe that the Machel government will collapse because of insurgent pressures within the next three months' warning period. The NRM has no significant political structure or program parallel to its military organization which can provide an alternative to the Machel regime. Analysts acknowledge, however, that the NRM does enjoy some popular support in central Mozambique which could spread if disenchantment with the Machel regime's inability to deal with the country's problems becomes widespread.

There was a consensus that Machel is reexamining his options and is hoping to: (1) gain increased military assistance from the Soviets, (2) negotiate a modus vivendi with Pretoria, and (3) encourage Western pressure--particularly from the US--on South Africa to inhibit Pretoria from escalating the conflict. Analysts also agreed that Machel does not want to ask for Cuban troops largely out of fear of South African retaliation. DIA expressed the opinion that a large-scale South African military incursion into Mozambique (as distinct from the pre-emptive or surgical strikes of the past) could be the kind of event that forces Machel to change his mind and that recent deliveries of Soviet armored equipment may reflect Mozambican fears of such an incursion. Pretoria does not appear to be contemplating any such move, however.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Libyan machinations in and around Chad continue to be of concern to Community analysts, all of whom expect intensified military operations against the Habre government at some point in the near future. Analysts continue to believe, however, that Qadhafi probably will work through Chadian dissidents rather than commit his own forces but do not rule out that he might "salt" the dissident forces with Libyan support and/or combat personnel. Qadhafi is attempting to recruit and train a surrogate army made up of dissidents and refugees but is not likely to have any short-term success given the limited abilities of those being recruited. Analysts are satisfied that current coverage would detect any major military operation against the Habre government--particularly from northern Chad--but are concerned that a gradual and dispersed buildup of anti-Habre forces would be difficult to spot. The

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fairly sizeable Chadian refugee population in the Central African Republic is another potential source of manpower for both Qadhafi and Chadian dissident leaders which has not yet been tapped largely because the refugees are scattered and disorganized. Joint CAR-French military maneuvers are expected to take place soon near the Chadian border. The operations may well be intended to "show the flag" and discourage the refugee population from involvement in dissident activities. The small Libyan contingent at Bangui remains inactive [REDACTED]

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ANGOLA

[REDACTED] analysts can only speculate that President dos Santos is maneuvering among various factions within the government in order to strengthen his position. What that maneuvering portends for future Angolan policy toward Namibia is difficult to discern at this point, however, and bears careful watching.

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GHANA

Earlier Community concern over Ghana's policy toward the US in the wake of recent anti-US media attacks has abated somewhat as the press campaign appears to have fallen off. Nevertheless, the next several months will be crucial for the regime, which is facing several food shortages and growing unemployment. Analysts agree that Ghana is facing a period of prolonged instability. [REDACTED]

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ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe continues to be of concern for the Community's analysts because of continuing dissident activity, tensions with South Africa and dwindling petrol supplies caused by disruption of the pipeline through Mozambique. Analysts do not expect any major threats to the government during the next few months, however. [REDACTED]

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